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Look around you when you are at work; if you don't have a diverse
workplace, what are you talking about at clinical conferences and in
clinic classes when you are discussing issues of diversity?1
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. A.B. 1978,
Dartmouth College; J.D. 1981, New York University. An earlier draft of this article was
presented at the Northeast Clinical Theory Workshop on April 28,1999. 1 thank workshop
organizer Professor Stephen Ellman and the several participants at the Clinical Theory
Workshop for their thoughtful suggestions and comments. I also thank Professors
Margaret Barry, Cecelia Espenoza, Placido Gomez, Michelle Jacobs, Chuck Jones, Peter
Joy, Odeana Neal, Jim Pope, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez and John W. Teeter, Jr., for
insightful critique, Professors David Chavkin and Robert Seibel for providing access to
their databases for some of the information contained in Part I and Terence M. Davis and
Aida R. Rojas for excellent research assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Professor
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., for crystallizing my uneasiness in advocating increased faculty
diversity as an African-American law professor but also for bolstering my resolve to so
advocate nonetheless. He stated:
I am a little sensitive about making an argument for diversity that, at least given
the present makeup of American law faculties, is likely to benefit me a black
male, directly or indirectly. I make it despite this danger for two reasons. First,
white people and white men in particular benefit from rules that implicitly favor
their appointment. I see few white men who defend such policies acknowledging
their potential conflict. Second, this is another example of the box that race
places me in: If I speak out against [diversity], I am also likely to be enriched by
the positive reaction of my colleagues to that possibility. I think I could make
more money if I were willing to be seen as a black conservative than if I were to
run against the current conservative trends. This frees me to argue for what I
believe is important and lets me leave the question of minor personal benefits to
another day.
Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Affirmative Action: Duke, The NAS
and Apartheid, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1141, 1157 n.51 (1992).
1. Professor Odeana Neal, Address at the Association of American Law Schools




In the past two decades, clinical legal education has evolved from
a novelty or boutique offering in law school curricula, to a relatively
settled and accepted component of the academy.2 Responding to
criticisms of prominent members of the bench and bar about the
failure of law schools to prepare law students for the practice of law,
American Bar Association accreditation standards now require law
schools to offer a course providing "live client" or "real life"
experiences 3 and every accredited law school now offers at least one
such course.4 In the same time period, the number of clinical teachers
has grown to comprise approximately 12% of all law teachers.5 While
much has been written about the composition of law and university
faculties, the value of faculty diversity in university and traditional
law school educational settings and proposals for reform,6 scant
attention has been paid to the composition of the increasingly
significant cadre of law professors engaging in clinical teaching and
scholarship and the educational and social consequences of the
demographic distribution of clinical faculty positions. At the Joint
Program of the Sections on Clinical Education, Minority Groups and
Poverty Law at the 1999 Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) Annual Meeting in New Orleans, a lively, provocative and
somewhat racially polarized discussion ensued about the clinical
faculty hiring process and the obstacles to obtaining diversity. The
problem of identifying, confronting and dealing with issues of
diversity and difference with respect to clients and students occurs
with such frequency in clinical scholarship and in discussions at
clinical conferences as to be part of the clinical education "canon"-
Groups, and Poverty Law (Jan. 9,1999).
2. I have previously summarized the development and evolution of clinical education
from its inception at the turn of the century to the present. See Jon C. Dubin, Clinical
Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1463-74 (1998).
3. See id. at 1467-69 (discussing blue ribbon ABA task force reports, public judicial
criticisms of legal education, and new ABA Standard 302(a) (August 1996)).
4. See e-mail from Professor David Chavkin, AALS Clinical Section Treasurer, to
Jon C. Dubin (July 12,1999) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
5. See Peter T. Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 93,
102 n.37 (1994). Professor Hoffman suggests that by 1993 there were 700 to 1000 clinical
teachers which comprised between 8 to 12% of the 8500 law teachers in the academy.
Because there are now over 1000 active, dues-paying members of the Association of
American Law Schools Clinical Section (and thus, well over 1000 clinical teachers), I have
assumed that the 12% figure is the more accurate estimate. See e-mail from Professor
David Chavkin, AALS Clinical Section Treasurer, to Jon C. Dubin (April 19, 1999) (on
file with Hastings Law Journal).
6. See, e.g., AALS, Papers of the Special Commission on Meeting the Challenges of
Diversity in an Academic Democracy (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.aals.org/1996>;
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to the extent a clinical canon is ascertainable.7 Nevertheless, what was
perhaps unique about the 1999 AALS Joint Program was that it
reflected the first time that the clinical section has devoted a program
to-in the words of program organizer Professor Paula Johnson-
"turning that lens on ourselves" and examining our conscious and
unconscious assumptions and values regarding clinical faculty hiring
and diversity.
This article explores the issues raised through discussion of
clinical diversity at the Joint Program.8 Part I examines the
demographic data on clinical faculty and what those data portend for
the "first generation" diversity issue of institutional access and the
"second generation" issues of institutional treatment, advancement
and acceptance. Those data reveal that the vast majority of law
schools have no clinicians of color, there are virtually no policy setting
clinical directors of color outside of the historically Black or Puerto
Rican law schools, and clinicians of color generally experience lesser
job security, lower pay and lesser job perquisites than white clinical
faculty.
Part II explores the rationales for diversity in legal education
generally and more specifically in clinical legal education programs.
Those rationales include recognition of the value of multiperspective,
multicultural and cross-cultural lawyering education and scholarship,
the promotion of non-discrimination and prevention of discrimination
in the academy and the legal profession at large, the benefits to
7. See, e.g., ALEx J. HURDER ET AL., CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE-
CLIENT CLINICS, ch. 3C (1997) (collecting readings under the heading "Transcending
Differences").
8. While there are many issues of diversity which could and should be explored in
connection with clinical legal education-i.e., gender, class, age, disability, religion,
ideology and sexual orientation issues, among other topics, and diversity with respect to
students and staff-this paper focuses on racial and ethnic faculty diversity. I utilize the
term "faculty of color" to denote faculty who are African-American/Black,
Hispanic/Latino, Asian or Pacific Islander or Native American, Eskimo or Aleut. See
generally Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE LJ. 705, 730 (noting the "irreducible link of commonality in the
experience of people of color... [because] rich or poor, male or female, learned or
ignorant, all people of color are to some degree 'outsiders' in a society that is intensely
color-conscious and in which the hegemony of whites is overwhelming" (quoting and
embellishing Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 1745, 1784 (1989)). For a discussion of gender diversity and gender discrimination in
clinical legal education, see Robert F. Seibel, Do Deans Discriminate?: An Examination of
the Lower Salaries Paid to Women Clinical Teachers, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J 541 (1996).
For the articulation of a "framework for analyzing which groups to include in a law
school's affirmative action program for student admission and faculty hiring," including
consideration of the role of individual and group identity in particular cases, see generally
Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society: Affirmative
Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995).
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students of color from the presence of mentors and role models of
color as the students struggle to acquire a sense of professional
identity and survival skills in a discriminatory legal system, and the
operational and functional needs of communities of color in
developing confidence in and working cooperatively with clinical
community legal services providers. The section on non-
discrimination includes discussion of some of the potential obstacles
to attaining and retaining clinical faculty diversity from the present
systems of law faculty personnel decisionmaking. Finally, Part III
develops a list of recommendations to ameliorate the problems
identified in Part I and to accomplish the purposes set out in Part II.
I. Clinical Diversity: Where We Stand at the Cusp of the New
Millennium
In 1997, the AALS Special Commission on Meeting the
Challenges of Diversity in an Academic Democracy convened and
developed a series of papers around issues of law school diversity.
The Commission distinguished between two types of diversity issues:
1) "'First generation' issues-those of access to enrollment and
employment in law schools"; and 2) "'[S]econd generation' issues:
the reception by law schools of students and faculty who belong to
groups that have traditionally been excluded from legal education." 9
While the Commission charge focused primarily on analysis of the
second generation issues, members noted that the first generation
access issues are still prevalent.10
The progress toward access and inclusion of faculty of color in
clinical education must be placed in context of progress in the
academy generally. The percentage of total faculty of color in the
academy has risen from 3.9% in 1980-81, to 5.4% in 1986-8711 to
13.2% in 1997-98.12 At the same time, the percentage of the
subcategory of clinical faculty of color started out higher but has
experienced slower and less steady growth in the 1990s from 5.4% in
1980-81, to 7.5% in 1986-8713 to 12.9% in 1998-99.14 Although
9. Lee Teitelbaum, First-Generation Issues: Access to Law School, in PERSPECIVES
ON DIVERSITY: AALS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF
DIVERSITY IN AN ACADEMIC DEMOCRACY (1997).
10. See id.; Rachel F. Moran, Introduction: The Dilemmas of Diversity (visited Feb. 4,
2000) <http://www.aals.org/moran.html.>.
11. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L REV. 537,556 tbl.1 (1988).
12. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (1997-
98).
13. See Chused, supra note 11, at 556. The Chused study actually observed an arguable
decrease in Black clinicians for a portion of the mid-1980s. Professor Chused stated:
Although blacks made up a somewhat higher portion of clinical teachers than of
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
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undoubtedly reflective of the woeful percentages of attorneys of color
from which the pool of law faculty candidates is comprised, 5 these
figures fall markedly below the proportion of persons of color in the
workforce16 or in the overall U.S. population. 7
classroom teachers in 1981, the rate of progress for clinical teachers has been
very slow in the last six years. Starting from a base of 4.3 percent (11/257) in
1981, black teachers constituted only 4.8% (18/372) of clinicians in 1987. The
trend is made even more disturbing by the entry since 1981 of a single new law
school-C.U.N.Y. Queens-that added six black clinicians at once. If that school
is removed from the 1987 data, only 3.5% (12/343) of clinicians were black. That
represents a decline of about twenty percent in the proportion of clinicians who
are black.
Id. at 541.
14. See e-mail from Professor David Chavkin, AALS Clinical Section Treasurer, to
Jon C. Dubin (Apr. 19, 1999) (on file with Hastings Law Journal). Professor Chavkin's
data is admittedly incomplete but is the best estimate available on clinical faculty. His data
reveals that there are presently 697 clinicians who have self-identified by race of the
approximately 1000 active clinicians in the clinical database. Of those 697, 607 or 87.1%
self-identify as White/Caucasian and 90 or 12.9% self-identify as clinicians of color as
follows: Black/African-American (52 or 7.5%), Hispanic/Latino/Chicano (23 or 3.3%),
Asian/Pacific Islander (11 or 1.6%) or Indian/Alaskan Native/Native American (4 or
0.56%) or multi-racial (2 or 0.28%). Because the AALS demographic data (for all faculty)
and Professor Chavkin's data (for clinical faculty) are both assembled through forms
requesting voluntary self-identification of racial and ethnic status, they may be subject to
some degree of underreporting.
15. The ABA Commission on Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession has
recently completed a census and concluded that 91% of ABA members are Caucasian,
2.3% are African-American, 2% are Hispanic, 1.8% are Asian American and 0.6% are
Native American. See American Bar Association, Division of Media Affairs and Public
Relations, ABA Membership 'Mirrors' Profession in Ethnic Diversity, Commission
Reports (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/media/jan99/g9min299.html>. The
Commission found that these membership figures "mirror" the legal profession as a
whole. See id. The trend up through the mid-1990s has been in the direction of greater
diversity in the legal profession. Thus, while only approximately 9% of the profession is
comprised from lawyers of color, the percentage of law school graduates of color has
increased from 12.31% in 1991 to 17.41% in 1995. See Yvonne J. Chandler, Why is
Diversity Important for Law Librarianship?, 90 L. LIBR. J. 545,551 (1998).
16. The United States Labor Department, Bureau of Labor Statistics determined that
persons of color comprised 25% of the labor market in 1996 reflecting 15,134,000 or 11%
African-Americans, 12,774,000 or 10% Hispanics, and 5,703,000 or 4% Asian and Pacific
Islander, Native American and Alaskan natives. See United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force by Sex, Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin,
1986, 1996, and Projected 2006 (visited Apr. 14, '1998)
<http://stats.bls.gov/ecopro.tablel.htm>. The workforce growth rates in this time period,
and as projected through 2006, also indicate a trend in the direction of greater
representation of persons of color. See id.
17. The United States Census Bureau's 1999 census data reveals that 76,423,000 or
27.9% of the U.S. population is comprised of persons of color, reflecting 33,051,000 or
12.1% African-American, 31,166,000 or 11.4% Hispanic, 10,186,000 or 3.7% Asian and
Pacific Islander and 2,020,000 or 0.7% American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut. See United
States Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, Population Division, Resident
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Furthermore, the overall number and percentage of law schools
lacking any representation of clinicians of color has also lagged
slightly behind the progress made in the rest of the academy.18 "The
1988 AALS Report of the Special Committee on Recruitment and
Retention of Minority Law Teachers indicated that in 1986-87, 30%
of all law schools had no teachers of color and 34% listed only one
teacher of color."' 9 By 1993-94 however, "the percentage of law
schools with no teachers of color declined to 5% (9 schools) and those
with only one teacher of color to 12% (21 schools). 20
Although by 1998-99, virtually every ABA accredited law school
had some course known as a "clinic" and thus some clinical faculty,21
110 (69%) of all law schools have no clinicians of color on the faculty,
41 (25.5%) have only one, and only 9 (5.5%) have reported more
than one clinician of color.2 Thus, while one might debate the
Population Estimates of the United States by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: April 1,1990
to May 1, 1999 (visited June 25, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/Population>. The Bureau
projects that by the year 2050, the percentage of persons of color will roughly equal the
percentage of Caucasians in the U.S. population. See Resident Population of the United
States: Middle Series Projections, 2035-2050, by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, with
Median Age, (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.census.gov/Population/Projections/
nation/nsrh/nprh 3550.txt>; see also David Hall, Giving Birth to A Racially Just Society in
the 21st Century, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 927, 935 (1999) (predicting that by the
year 2030, the number of people of color will exceed the number of whites in this country
for the first time, that the pace of non-white population growth will substantially outpace
white population growth through the rest of the century, and observing that America at
the end of the twenty-first century will resemble twentieth century South Africa unless we
"correct the systemic inequality that exists along racial lines"); id. at n.29 (citing Robert
Pear, New Look at the U.S. in 2050: Bigger Older, and Less White, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1992, at Al, and noting that "between 1992 and 2050, the growth rate of African
Americans will increase by 93.8%; Latinos 237.5%; Asian and Pacific Islanders 412.5%;
and Native Americans 109.1%, compared to only a 29.4% increase for white Americans");
see generally DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING WHITE MINORITY: CALIFORNIA'S
ERUPTIONS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE (1996) (discussing the social and political
implications of white minority status in the twenty-first century).
18. This development runs counter to assumptions of job steering and ghettoization of
professors of color in "lower status" courses in the academy such as "skills" courses. See
generally Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race and Credentials: The Truth
About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 262-64 (1997)
(finding high correlation of gender in lower status skills courses such as clinics, legal
writing, trial or appellate advocacy, or other skills offerings, but that "neither race nor the
sex-race interaction exerted a significant influence on this type of a teaching assignment").
19. Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 7.
20. Id.
21. See Chavkin, supra note 4. Since 1996, ABA accreditation standards have
required that each law school "shall offer a live-client or real life practical experience
through clinics or externships, although it need not offer this experience to all students."
ABA Standard 302(d) (Aug. 1996).
22. See e-mail from Professor David Chavkin to Jon C. Dubin (Apr. 20, 1999) (on file
with Hastings Law Journal). These figures exclude the historically Black law schools and
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significance of the progress and continuous movement toward
diversity in clinical legal education, one cannot seriously suggest that
we have even minimally transcended basic diversity access issues
when nearly 70% of all law schools still have no clinicians of color.
A "major lesson law schools can learn from other sectors of
higher education is that issues of access are quite different from issues
of engagement, once access is achieved at even some modest level."3
To put it another way, "just because one has a ticket to the theater is
no guarantee that one will enjoy the show."24 Preliminary data on the
second generation issues of advancement, job security,2 and pay26
reflect disparities, particularly with respect to women of color.27 For
example, only approximately 7 of the 159 (4.5%) clinical directors
outside of the minority operated law schools are persons of color3 s
While it might be premature to ascribe an impenetrable "glass
ceiling" 29 designation to the racial disparity on advancement into
these directorship positions, these figures are significant since clinical
directors often set clinical policy and prerogatives, make curricular
decisions, assign workload responsibilities, and determine or
substantially influence clinical hiring and retention decisions. They
also typically enjoy greater compensation and perquisites than other
those on the island of Puerto Rico.
23. Troy Duster, What We Can Learn from Other Experiences in Higher Education
(visited Feb. 4,2000) <http://www.aals.org/duster.html>.
24. Id.
25. Professor Chavkin's database reveals that 33% of white clinicians have tenure as
compared with 26% of clinicians of color, 4% have "clinical tenure" as opposed to 3% for
clinicians of color; 20% of white clinicians have long-term contracts as compared with 16%
for clinicians of color; 29% are on short-term contracts as compared with 34% of clinicians
of color; and 10% are on the tenure track as opposed to 19% for clinicians of color. See
Chavkin, supra note 5.
26. See Seibel, supra note 8, at 553-54 (1993-94 data reveals that clinicians of color
averaged about 90% of the earnings of similarly experienced white clinicians and women
of color also earned considerably less than similarly situated white women and men of
color).
27. For a discussion of the particularly pervasive obstacles confronting women of color
in legal academia, see Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race and Credentials:
The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199
(1997); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical
Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2299 (1992).
28. See Chavkin, supra note 14.
29. The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991 and the Glass Ceiling Commission's reports,
"confirm what many of us have suspected all along-the existence of invisible, artificial
barriers blocking women and minorities from advancing up the corporate ladder to
management and executive level positions." FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN




While there are no available data on clinical faculty turnover or
retention rates by race and ethnicity, there are relevant related (albeit
somewhat dated) data on this subject. Professor Chused's 1988 study
revealed that as a general matter, the departure rates in clinical
contract positions are higher than all other positions in the academy
other than legal writing contract positions.30 Chused also found that
African-American tenured professors throughout the academy left
law teaching at a rate more than twice that of white tenured
professors and that African-American untenured professors move to
other schools before their tenure decisions at twice the rate of white
untenured professors.31
One hypothesis proffered for the substantial racial disparity in
departure rates for law faculty is the burden of "tokenism." 32
Professor Chused opined:
[t]he numbers may simply be confirming what we intuitively
understand, that being a minority token in a majority institution
can be extremely difficult .... Schools wishing to retain minority
faculty members may need to hire several within a short time in
order to avoid the sense of isolation that could prompt their
departure.33
Professor Rachel Moran has provided further elaboration on the
"burdens" of being a "society of one" on a law faculty. She writes:
The psychological and social consequences of membership in a
'Society of One' are pervasive and severe. The lone minority or
woman professor is likely to encounter two extreme reactions.
Some students and faculty will expect the minority or woman
professor to serve as a representative of all minorities and women.
These expectations will manifest themselves in demands for
compliance with an impossible standard of performance. Another
group will stigmatize the isolated minority or woman professor by
assuming that he or she is inherently less capable than white male
colleagues and was appointed only because of affirmative action.
These dehumanizing views ignore the unique individual
characteristics of minority and women law professors by either
elevating them to superhuman symbol or reducing them to
substandard political appointment. Both reactions have devastating
30. Chused, supra note 11, at 543.
31. Id. at 544-45; see also Joyce Hughes, Reverse Discrimination and Higher Education
Faculty, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 397-98 & n.12 (1998) (noting that less than 2.5% of
faculty members at predominantly white colleges and universities are African-American
and that the tenure rate for African-American faculty is only 42.9%).
32. See Chused, supra note 11, at 539 ("Racial tokenism is alive and well at American
law schools."), 546 & n.43; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Application of the "Tipping Point"
Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L. REV. 319 (1986); Portia Y.T.
Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26 How. L. J. 443 (1983).
33. Chused, supra note 11, at 546.
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consequences.34
While there is no precise data on the tokenism and isolation
problems identified above for clinical faculty, the above figures reveal
that only nine majority operated law schools have greater than one
clinician of color on the faculty. While the burdens borne and
isolation experienced by clinicians of color at other law schools might
be offset by the increasing representation of non-clinical faculty of
color at some schools,35 that might not be meaningful at schools
where the clinical programs are geographically or functionally
separate from the law school.
H. The Value of Faculty Diversity in Clinical Education36
There are two broad rationales behind the creation and
employment of diversity and affirmative action programs generally
and for students and faculty at American law schools more
specifically: a compensatory rationale designed to serve as a
corrective for past injustice and exclusion and an instrumental or
functional approach which seeks to secure future-oriented benefits
such as "the educational value of a diverse faculty and student body
and the external benefits that flow from the professional success of an
individual to other members of the group."37 Because of the difficulty
of ascertaining causation, responsibility and sufficiently individualized
injury under formalist applications of the corrective rationale,38 the
34. Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of One, 20
U.S.F. L. REv. 503,512-13 (1986); see also Paula C. Johnson, The Role of Minority Faculty
in the Recruitment and Retention of Students of Color, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 313, 321-22
(1992); see generally Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors' Lives:
The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 369 (1989) ("Large numbers
of minority law professors are overworked, excluded from informal information networks
and describe their work environment as hostile, unsupportive, or openly or subtly racist.
Many face increasing challenges to their legitimacy in the classroom. The anecdotal
material from the interviews does little to dispel the picture, drawn by the survey results,
of a beleaguered group of teachers struggling to maintain credibility.").
35. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
36. I previously have discussed the value of clinical faculty diversity as a factor in the
design of clinical programs. See Dubin, supra note 2, at 1498-1503.
37. Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 859; Moran, supra note 10, at 3; see generally
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) (discussing and analyzing rationales and
justifications for affirmative action); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND
WHIrE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES (1996) (same).
38. See Jonathan Alger, When Color-Blind is Color Bland: Ensuring Faculty Diversity
in Higher Education, 10 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 192 (1999) ("Recent court decisions
have made it increasingly difficult for institutions to rely upon this discrimination based
rationale for race-conscious affirmative action programs."); see, e.g., City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (contractor set asides for minority construction companies are
not narrowly tailored to remedy identifiable discrimination by the City of Richmond);
March 20001 FACULTY DIVERS=T
forward looking or future-oriented diversity based rationales have
grown in favor.39 However, even under the future-oriented
approaches, a group's history of discrimination creates a "special
claim" for inclusion and is quite relevant in ascertaining the
instrumental or functional value of diversity in the relevant context.4°
Apart from the justifications for faculty diversity in the academy
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (University of Texas affirmative action
admissions program was not narrowly tailored to remedy the identifiable present effects of
its own past discrimination); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (voiding
race-conscious university scholarships not narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination); see also Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 865-67.
39. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNiVERSITY
ADMISSIONS 278 (1998) (empirical study by Presidents of Harvard and Princeton
Universities documenting the many future-oriented beneficial effects of affirmative action
and diversity in higher education and explicitly finding that "taking account of race helps
institutions achieve three objectives central to their mission-identifying individuals of
high potential, permitting students to benefit educationally from diversity on campus, and
addressing long-term societal needs"). In 1978, a divided Supreme Court held that a
university admissions program may consider racial and ethnic diversity as a "plus" factor
in assessing applicants. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). The decisive separate opinion of Justice Powell found that: racial and ethnic
diversity is an element among the "range of factors a university properly may consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body"; that "attainment of a diverse student
body.., clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education"; that the benefits sought to be attained from a diverse student body include the
"robust exchange of ideas"; that the special First Amendment concerns of academic
freedom and "the freedom of a university to make judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body"; but that inflexible quotas based solely on race or ethnicity
were unconstitutional. Id. at 311-14 (Opinion of Powell, J.). For discussion and analysis of
the legality of various higher education affirmative actions programs predicated upon
future-oriented diversity rationales, see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 381 (1998); Marty B. Lorenzo, Race-Conscious Diversity Admissions Programs:
Furthering a Compelling Interest, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 361 (1997); Note, An Evidentiary
Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1357 (1996). A few recent and high profile judicial decisions have challenged the validity
and application of the forward-looking diversity justifications. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d
at 932 (striking down race-based affirmative action in law school admissions and rejecting
the Bakke diversity rationale's continuing validity); cf. Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d
1547, 1561 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (rejecting diversity as a sufficiently compelling
justification to support a race-based faculty layoff preference but "wholeheartediy
endors[ing]... cases extolling the educational value of exposing students to persons of
diverse races and backgrounds"); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998)
(assuming arguendo that diversity may be a sufficiently compelling justification to support
a race-based affirmative action plan at an exclusive Boston preparatory school but voiding
the plan as not narrowly tailored since it admits more students of color than are needed
for diversity purposes).
40. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 859. All of the rationales for faculty diversity
discussed in Part II below respond to conditions which are prevalent because of the
consequences of invidious discrimination.
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generally, there are additional clinic-specific considerations
compelling an even greater diversity imperative in clinical education.
Four are discussed below.41
A. Multiperspective, Multicultural and Cross-Cultural Lawyering,
Education and Scholarship
"[M]uch of the point of [higher] education is to teach students
how others think and to help them understand different points of
view-to teach students how to be sovereign, responsible, and
informed citizens in a heterogeneous democracy." 42 Indeed, "the
arguments for diversity among faculty in higher education are as
compelling as [those for] student body diversity [recognized in Justice
Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke] and rely upon the same
theoretical framework."43 They are premised upon the creation of a
holistic learning environment as part of the institution's educational
mission which promotes a sense of community of students and
teachers who learn from their interactions and "robust exchange of
ideas" with one another in and outside of the classroom.44 Moreover,
the benefits of faculty diversity accrue to students and faculty alike
and to faculty at other institutions "across the country and around the
world."45 As explained by the United States Department of
Education in its policy guidance establishing somewhat greater
latitude for race-based financial aid to persons seeking careers in
academia:
[A] college's academic freedom in the 'robust exchange of ideas'
includes an interest in the existence of a diverse faculty and, more
generally, in diversity of professors nationally, since scholars
engage in the interchange of ideas with others in their field, and not
merely with faculty at their particular school.46
As a general matter, these propositions apply with greater force
to an educational discipline such as the study of law that is so deeply
41. A fifth rationale for law faculty diversity, applicable to clinical and non-clinical
faculty alike, is discussed infra at note 105.
42. Akil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745,
1774 (1996).
43. Alger, supra note 38, at 199; see also University and Community College Sys. v.
Farmer, 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997) (holding that the University demonstrated a compelling
interest in fostering a culturally and ethnically diverse faculty and that the rationales for
seeking faculty diversity were analogous to those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
Bakke for student body diversity); see also supra note 39, discussing Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke.
44. Alger, supra note 38, at 199.
45. Id. at 195.
46. Department of Education, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs;
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 n.8 (1994) [hereinafter,
DOE].
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informed by human experience and personal interaction. More
specifically, these concepts are even more central to clinical legal
education which focuses on lawyering in an increasingly pluralistic
and multicultural society and which usually entails small classes and
interactive and collaborative educational experiences.
The importance of a diverse law faculty or student body does not
depend on the false notion that there is an essential voice of persons
of color or that "one's race defines a particular way of thinking about
law and policy."47 Rather, as explained by Dean Paul Brest and
Miranda Oshige:
It does assume the reality-no less a reality because it is socially
constructed-that people of different races and ethnicities often
have different life experiences that affect their relations with
members of other groups and influence their views on issues of
legal doctrine and policy. For example, African Americans
regularly encounter discrimination not experienced by whites and
often scarcely believable to them. Policies that seem 'neutral' to a
dominant group may have quite different meaning for members of
other racial or ethnic groups. This has important implications both
for the interpersonal and intellectual lives of students and faculty.48
The value of faculty diversity to the depth and breadth of
evolving clinical pedagogy, clinical scholarship, and lawyering theory,
is significant. One commentator has gone as far as to suggest that
while white and black lawyers practice the same law, they have
decidedly different views of how the system works. 49 It is a fact of life
that peoples' backgrounds affect the way they evaluate and perceive
the world. Faculty with diverse backgrounds approach the tasks of
designing clinical programs and curricula, and producing and
disseminating knowledge (whether in the form of traditional
scholarship or otherwise) in ways which reflect the diversity of their
backgrounds and experiences. 50 The resulting debates over the value
47. Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 862.
48. Id.
49. See Terry Carter, Divided Justice, White and Black Lawyers May Practice the Same
Law but They Have Decidedly Different Views on How the System Works, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1999, at 42-43.
50. See Stephen Ellmann et al., Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-Journal?, 1 CLIN. L. REV.
1, 6 (1994) (racial diversity in the clinical education community "helps assure that we will
see much more work in the future that re-examines the validity of clinical theories and
practices from truly multicultural and multiracial perspectives"). Cf Kennedy, supra note
8, at 728 (denying the existence of a "black point of view" or "'black voice' in any
essentialist (or racialist) sense" but arguing that since scholarship "'flows naturally' from
our backgrounds, education and individual peculiarities[,] it is obvious that some
significant proportion of minority intellectuals would be led in this way to write about
minority legal issues"); id. at 730 ("Scholars with ties to subordinated communities are
uniquely situated in respect to these ideological resources and more likely than white
scholars to mobilize them to contribute to our understanding of law-in-society.").
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and meaning of accepted or traditional pedagogy or scholarship are
"both natural and beneficial [and] an ongoing source of renewal in
the academy. '51
Thus for example, it is not surprising that with the growth in the
population of clinicians of color, clinical programs have increasingly
focused on new underserved populations,52 or on different ways of
serving and teaching about serving underserved groups. 53 At the same
time, there has been an increase in clinical scholarship which
deconstructs or reconstructs existing canons of clinical teaching and
knowledge,54 or which introduces outsider perspectives from other
disciplines, such as critical race theory, into lawyering theory and
analysis. 55
Another concrete example of the influence of clinical faculty of
color is the emergence of multicultural lawyering theory and
instruction as an important element of the continuum of professional
competency instruction and of clinical education.56 Professor Charles
51. Moran, supra note 10, at 10.
52. See, Duster, supra note 23, at 5; see, e.g., Robert A. Williams Jr., Vampires
Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741, 762-65 (1997) (discussing
operation of critical race practice clinic focusing on Indian Law at the University of
Arizona).
53. See Margaret Martin Barry, A Question of Mission: Catholic Law School's
Domestic Violence Clinic, 38 How. L.J. 135, 160-61 (1994) (describing empowerment
approach of Catholic Law School's Families and the Law Clinic and criticizing clinical
models which "dabble in people's lives to sharpen a few skills" and which abdicate
responsibility to serve the poor or to "pay attention to the social justice obligation to
respond to what is really happening in the communities ostensibly served"); see generally
GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAwYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (describing collaborative and empowering model of
"rebellious lawyering" in subordinated communities).
54. See, e.g., Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 345 (1997) (deconstructing the
traditional Binder and Price "client-centered" counseling model and developing a cross-
cultural lawyering and student self-awareness training model for clinical instruction based
on analysis of social scientists' empirical data documenting the significance of race in
client-counselor interactions). These scholarly developments have not been confined to
the writings of scholars of color. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, The Transformative Potential of
Clinical Legal Education, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 603, 605 (1997) (deconstructing "the
'generic' approach to teaching clinical skills that became popular in the 1980s... and how
that tradition, through its purported blindness to race, and class subordination, worked to
reinforce rather than reduce, race and class privilege").
55. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C.
Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory, 51
SMU L. REv. 1423 (1998); cf Margaret Russell, Beginner's Resolve: An Essay on
Collaboration, Clinical Innovation and the First Year Curriculum, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 135
(1994) (describing the use of clinical methodology to elucidate critical 'outsider'
perspectives in first year courses).
56. Professor Bill Ong Hing has identified multicultural or "personal identification"
instruction as essential to teaching about good community-oriented lawyering in
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Calleros writes:
[S]ome law students may expect to practice law in a field in which
race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, physical and mental
ability, economic class, and other significant personal
characteristics simply do not matter. Thus, a graduate may try to
define a narrow legal niche in which he or she can maintain at least
the illusion that sensitivity to diverse perspectives is unnecessary
for a successful practice of law. However, even those who do not
seek to challenge the legal system's claims of objectivity will find it
difficult to deny or escape the cultural pluralism of our national
identity, because that pluralism often introduces an extra layer of
complexity to legal disputes and may create special challenges in
representing diverse clients.57
Professor Michelle Jacobs has observed that even the application
of basic professional lawyering skills such as interviewing and
counseling can cause marginalization, as opposed to empowerment,
of clients in the lawyer-client relationship unless students are
instructed on how to interact with clients who are different from
them.58 She advocates a form of cross-cultural counseling instruction
that teaches students how to interact with clients and calls for
examining our students' and our own limited pre-understandings and
misconceptions about our clients.59  International lawyers have
subordinated communities. He writes:
Good community oriented lawyers, I believe, are humble not paternalistic,
identify and work with other allies in the community, respect the client's own
talents and skills, work in partnership with the client, respect the client's
informed judgment on case strategies, strive to demystify the law and procedure
for clients, engage in substantial amounts of community education, consider an
array of alternative approaches to legal problems, and get to know the
community, much like a legal anthropologist. In teaching about good community
lawyering, I stress that lawyers need to be conscious of the class, race, ethnicity,
culture, gender, sexual orientation, possible physical disability, and age of the
attorney, the client, their allies, their enemies, and other institutional players.
Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender,
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv.
1807,1808 (1993).
57. Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8
LA RAZA LJ. 140,142 (1995); see also Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis"
to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLIN. L. REv. 65, 78-79 (1997) ("Both American Society and
the legal profession are becoming more diverse. It will become incumbent upon lawyers to
seek out and give voice to a range of viewpoints in stating legal problems and fashioning
their solutions."); David Dominguez, Beyond Zero-Sum Games: Multiculturalism as
Enriched Law Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175, 177 (1994) ("[S]tudents
understand the importance of being prepared for a problem-solving profession that is
increasingly heterogeneous even within the white male community, and certainly among
the growing numbers of professional colleagues, clients, and jurists who are women,
people of color, people with disabilities, or people from other unfamiliar backgrounds.").
58. See Jacobs, supra note 54, passim.
59. See Jacobs, supra note 54, at 407 ("Unless we have the courage to look at the
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deemed these insights on cross-cultural lawyering pedagogy, as
reflecting an important component of training law students to be
effective practitioners in an increasingly global, multicultural
environment. 60
Faculty diversity and the inclusion of both "insider" and
"outsider" perspectives in the collaborative clinical firm enhance the
learning environment for lessons of multiculturalism as they are not
only a focus of discussion in a given class or case but can be
reinforced through a constant dialogue among multiple participants.
6
'
In a more general sense, diversity can enhance both the educational
and legal product of clinical programs by increasing the variety of
viewpoints and ideas brought to the endeavor and the resulting
availability of creativity, talent and experience. 62 That is why diverse
organizations and groups often exceed the performance of those with
less diversity.63
[A]ttitudes, cognitive functioning, and beliefs are not randomly
distributed in the population, but tend to vary systematically with
demographic variables such as age, race, and gender. Therefore, an
expected consequence of increased cultural diversity in
behaviors of our students and ourselves, our attempts to improve the lawyer-client
relationship through client-centered counseling will remain less than satisfying."); see also
O'Leary, supra note 57, at 66, passim (advocating "difference analysis to teach students to
engage in routine examinations of a diverse range of viewpoints when assisting a client
rather than focusing on options derived from the student's own world view"); Kim E.
Baggett, Cross-Cultural Legal Counseling, 18 CREIGHTON L. REv. 145 (1985) (advocating
increased legal education and training in cross-cultural counseling); cf. Isabelle R.
Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DISP.
RESOL. 55, 86-87 (arguing that mediators need "cross-cultural mediation training" in
order to "think about power imbalances that result from negative cultural myths and
interpretive frameworks").
60. See Adele Blackett, Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for Law
School Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 74-75 (1998) (arguing that
"teaching law students to be effective actors in a globalized environment may have at least
as much to do with cross-cultural sensitivity and a knowledge of the world than with the
way 'the law' is taught"); Roberta C. Ramo, A Practitioner Looks at Globalization 1, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 314 (1996) (reaching similar conclusions).
61. Cf. Gunning, supra note 55, at 89 (arguing that use of diverse mediation teams may
provide "symbolic and practical advantages to a mediation" and "has the advantage of
conveying to the parties that there is at least an opportunity or possibility that one's
circumstances and experiences can be understood"); see generally Jacobs, supra note 54, at
405 n.279 (noting that cross-cultural legal counseling model "recognize[s] that there is no
monolithic black or white indigent experience" and would be "instrumental" for lawyers
and law students of any race dealing with dissimilar clients); Margaret E. Montoya,
Voicing Differences, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 147, 152-57 (1997) (discussing the need for "re-
mapping the learning environment" to provide space for the voicing of both insider and
outsider student perspectives in the teaching of difference and similarity).
62. See George R. Jackson, R-E-S-P-E-C-T, Find Out What It Means to Me, 90 L.
LIBR. J. 579, 581 (1998).
63. See id.
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organizations is the presence of different perspectives for the
performance of creative tasks... [D]ifferences among team
members allow them to see problems from a variety of perspectives
based on a range of experiences. The variety of perspectives and
natural conflict that surfaces from their interaction ensure that
differing views surface and are discussed.... [W]hile diverse groups
experience more conflict in agreeing on what is important and in
working together at the outset, they ultimately outperform
homogeneous groups in identifying problem perspectives and
generating alternative perspectives.64
B. Non-Discrimination
Diversity can also serve a prophylactic function of protecting
against discrimination. This includes protection from discrimination
in the institutional or academic environment as well as protection
against discrimination in the legal system at large. "[A]n institution
may adhere to practices that have an unintended disparate impact on
members of minority groups-for example, placing undue reliance on
'old boy' networks for information about applicants or appointments
candidates. '65 Professor Duncan Kennedy has suggested that race and
class based differences in access to educational resources and the
lingering consequences of standardized testing "screen out millions of
64. Id. (quoting Gail Robinson & Kathleen Dechant, Building a Business Case for
Diversity, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1997, at 21,27).
65. Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 867 n.43; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 713
n.22 ("I would say most law school faculties give too much weight to paper credentials,
overvalue old boy connections, make bad intuitive judgments based on interviews, and
tend to misevaluate the substantive quality of presentations and written work when
applying formally colorblind standards. For these reasons, the current institutional
interpretation of standards yields no more than a very loose approximation of what I
myself regard as merit."); Odeana R. Neal, The Making of a Law Teacher, 6 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 128, 131 n.8 (1990-91) (noting that while persons of color are often
presumed not to be qualified for their academic positions because considerations of race
may have played a role in their selection, this presumption ignores the fact that academic
hiring frequently considers factors which have nothing to do with job qualifications such as
a teaching candidates' friendships with hiring members of the faculty, alumni status, prior
contact with the school, or presumed scholarly potential based on completion of a judicial
clerkship). Clinical faculty selection processes tend to vary more from school to school
than general law faculty selection. Some schools employ the usual faculty selection
process for clinical faculty, which relies heavily on pre-screening from the AALS
Appointments Register-a catalogue of potential law faculty candidates. The pre-
screening is then followed up by interviews at the AALS Appointments Conference
(commonly referred to as the "meat market") and "call-back" interviews and candidate
presentations before the full faculty at the home campuses. Other law schools allow their
clinical faculty or clinical directors to play a more dominant role in selection, particularly
with respect to the selection of non-tenure track clinical faculty. From my personal
observations and discussions with many other clinicians at other schools, it is my belief
that, regardless of the form, clinical faculty selection processes have suffered from many of
the same diversity-obstructive deficiencies identified by Professor Kennedy.
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people who might be able to do the job of law professor better than
those who end up getting it."'66 He also observed that law faculties
tend to "fetishize credentials" that are only weak proxies for
performance. 67 The resulting standards or criteria of merit have "a
narcissistic payoff since [they] endlessly reaffirm[ ] the merits of those
who make judgments of merit. ' 68 In Kennedy's words, this tends to
"coerce minorities who want the rewards we have to offer into 'being
like us' ' 69 in a manner which appears colorblind and quite normal to
whites.70
66. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 717; cf Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101
YALE LJ. 1357, 1361-64 (1992) (reviewing DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION:
THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991)); Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role
Models, and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentations of an African-American Female Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 90 (1990-91) (describing range of
discriminatory concerns which often accompany the hiring of African-American women
law professors).
67. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 719. Professor Kennedy gives as an example, the
request for and evaluation of a "law school transcript of a candidate for a teaching job who
is thirty-five years old and has written four law review articles and taught several thousand
law students." Id. at 719. I have personally observed faculty requests for transcripts of
grades for clinical teaching candidates of color (followed up by negative evaluation of
their candidacies based in part on their grades) who were lateral hires, each with more
than six years of teaching experience at other law schools, several publications, significant
practice experience before teaching, and between 12 to 16 years removed from law school
graduation.
68. Id. at 720. For a contrary argument on the validity of the academy's standards of
merit, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). For critiques of the
Farber/Sherry position, see John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior-
Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" of Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1589 (1999); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To The Bone: Race and
White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (1999).
69. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 720.
70. An apt and analogous description of this problem can be found in the literature on
librarianship diversity. As one librarian observed:
The white middle class, where the bulk of librarians are coming from, that's their
world, that's their cultural environment, and they move in and out of the
environment they were born in ... Minorities, even if their education is equal to
that of whites, don't come with the same cultural attitudes, language, social
connections, and ways of doing things as whites do; thus they don't have the same
cultural advantage... White culture gets to have its way because they're the ones
who set the standard. If you're born into that, you don't see the advantage; if
you're not born into it, you're bucking the trend.
Evan St. Lifer & Corrinne Nelson, Unequal Opportunities: Race Does Matter, LIBR. J.,
Nov. 1 1997, at 42, 44 (quoting interview of Patricia Tarin); see generally Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural
experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs
affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
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The applicability of Professor Kennedy's academy wide
observations to clinical personnel assessments was also borne out at
the AALS Joint Program in January. At least one participant openly
pointed out, and several others agreed, that the simulated and small
group hiring meeting discussions revealed that clinical faculty
members also have a tendency to "create in their own image" when
participating in personnel decisions. That clinical section members
tend to be more ideologically liberal and consciously "anti-racist"
than the academy at large7' has not seemingly altered this
phenomenon.72 Professor Robert Seibel has observed:
Privileged individuals generally have difficulty perceiving the many
71. See Dubin, supra note 2, at 1467 (collecting articles describing predominant liberal
public interest lawyering backgrounds of the clinicians hired in the first phase of the
modem clinical movement); see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the
Justice Mission, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 469, 470 n.3 (1992) (observing in 1992 that clinical
faculty members continue to be selected predominantly from public interest backgrounds
although somewhat less so than the first wave of clinicians).
72. In the words of Professor Placido Gomez: "A liberal 'old boy' network is still an
'old boy' network and this network is secure. These 'old boys' are united in the conviction
that their past actions and liberal attitudes immunize them-they can do no wrong. They
are protected, even from critique." E-mail from Professor Placido Gomez to Jon C.
Dubin (Dec. 21, 1999) (on file with Hastings Law Journal). John Calmore has labeled the
"racism of the political left[,J an aversive racism that is reflected in an ambivalence.
Aversive racists sincerely embrace egalitarian norms, but still act in subtle prejudiced and
racist ways." John 0. Calmore, Racelism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty,
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1076-77 (1998) (citations omitted); see also Samuel L.
Lidesture & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 1986). In contrast to
overt racial hatred and bigotry, racial resentment, or so-called "rational racism" derived
from anti-black socialization, "[a]versive racism is described as subtle, 'subconscious,
discriminatory acts and feelings of people who genuinely do not want to be that way."'
John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1067, 1088 (1998) (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, The Subtler Shades of Racism:
Private Emotions Lay Behind Public Disclosure, WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at A3). "It is
culturally manifested as the racism of denial among well-intentioned whites" who are
unable "'to acknowledge their negative racial feelings and their apparent rejection of
negative stereotypes, together with their sympathetic feelings toward victims of injustice,
convince them that their racial attitudes are largely positive, and certainly not prejudiced.'
This aversive racism fuels apathy and social distance." Id. at 1089 (citations omitted).
Calmore concludes that "resolving issues of aversive racism calls upon those whites of
good will to interrogate their own inherited white privilege, to investigate their complicity
in racism, and to deal with the fact that, while they may not have authored racism, they
certainly have inherited it." Id. at 1090; see also Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach
"Justice, Fairness, and Morality", 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, passim (1997) (discussing
techniques of clinical methodology designed to promote a critical consciousness of the
operation of power and invisible privilege); cf. Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Acciden"
Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1233 (1999) (refuting argument that anti-
discrimination law should be altered to excuse unconscious discrimination, because this
form of racism is not beyond the control of the actor and imposes deleterious costs on its
victims).
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ways in which those who are relatively without privilege experience
their disadvantage. The term 'relatively without privilege' reflects
the reality that we all are privileged with respect to some group or
groups.... As a white male (and I thought of myself as a liberal
and sensitive white male), I did not see that my colleagues who are
women or people of color have different experiences as clinical
teachers. Yet my findings indicate that teachers in these groups are
generally disadvantaged relative to white clinical faculty. My
experience reveals how hard it is to believe and understand the
plight of those who are less advantaged than oneself, no matter
where one stands on the hierarchy of privilege.
73
For example, one of the more contentious and racially polarized
discussions at the AALS Joint Program in January 1999 centered over
a dispute whether it was appropriate to disqualify a Latina candidate
who had not come to her interview with a plan for how she would
conduct her clinic. Several white clinicians thought it was inexcusable
to come to a clinical interview without having obtained sufficiently
detailed information about the sought after position. On the other
hand, several clinicians of color disagreed, arguing that hiring
committees should not assume that the same informal networks of
mentoring, job coaching, and information dissemination are readily
available to lawyers of color-even to those who are from middle
class backgrounds and who attended elite law schools.
The institutional inclusion of faculty and other decisionmakers of
color enhances the likelihood of more pluralistic and less exclusionary
decisionmaking and "would reduce the nagging sense that our ability
to assess merit is consciously or unconsciously corrupted." 74 In the
73. Seibel, supra note 8, at 542; see generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (describing
allocation of "invisible" privileges and impact on American society); Antoinette Sedillo
Lopez, On Privilege, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 217 (1994) (noting that "[y]ou only notice
privilege when you don't have it"); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1709 (1993) (describing distribution of societal benefits and vested rights based on
white racial identity); Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,
CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan.-Feb. 1992 (compiling a list of 46 examples of white skin
privilege).
74. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 720. This is not to say that the mere inclusion of
decisionmakers and power holders of color will assure fairness and non-discrimination in
all decisionmaking affecting persons of color. The poisonous influence of racism
sometimes causes persons of color-themselves victims of invidious discrimination-to
"respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from
the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the
minority." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing
studies). Moreover, the opinions of persons of color who criticize other persons of color
are often accorded enhanced legitimacy and standing in the eyes of white persons due to
the underlying assumption that the claims of discrimination by persons of color-but not
those of whites who may benefit from that very discrimination and resulting privilege-are
self-interested acts of special pleading. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF
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clinical context, greater faculty diversity would also provide an
additional safeguard against the unconscious and conscious
discriminatory treatment of clients, students and staff of color.
Moreover, non-discrimination is a skill or value of the profession.
The 1992 Report of the American Bar Association, Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, chaired by ABA
President Robert MacCrate (the "MacCrate Report") establishes a
professional competency imperative to refrain from engaging in
invidious discrimination in one's personal interactions with clients,
witnesses, support staff, and other individuals. 75 This goal can be
effectuated through clinical instruction in the many subtle and
unsubtle ways in which invidious discrimination permeates our legal
system.76
Faculty diversity is also central to the goals of non-discrimination
and non-discrimination instruction. Professor Michelle Jacobs has
pointed out that the discussion of sensitive racial issues that arise in
clinic cases "is presumably one of the reasons why it is important to
have people of color on faculties and in clinical programs ... [-to]
expose the students to these issues from a perspective that was
previously missing in the academy and in the profession. '77
Professor Charles Lawrence writes:
The diversity rationale is inseparable from the purpose of
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACIsM 109-26 (1992). Finally, some persons of color
choose silence in response to witnessing or experiencing discrimination. This is because
"[t]o acknowledge their race-related anger or frustration... would be to alienate (and
perhaps provoke reprisals from) those whites whose goodwill was essential to their well-
being." ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 31 (Harper Perrenial 1995); see
also Calmore, supra note 72, at 1086-87 n.106 (discussing increased white "race fatigue"-
another way of saying whites are "sick of the whole issue [of racial discrimination]"); see
also O'Leary, supra note 57, at 65 and n.1 (quoting an unnamed "experienced clinical
professor" as saying: "If I have to go to one more conference dealing with difference I'm
going to scream"). This "race fatigue" phenomena results in persons of color who choose
to speak out sometimes experiencing discrimination twice: first, when it happens, and
second, when they speak out on it. See COSE, supra. I have personally observed a clinical
job candidate suffer increased opposition to her candidacy after she expressed the opinion
that she suffered invidious discrimination on an earlier job. At least two white faculty
members expressed that they were tired of hearing racial explanations for job difficulties
in this day and age.
75. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, (REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP) 213-14 (1992) (promoting the professional value of "Justice,
Fairness and Morality" by refraining from "any form of discrimination... in one's
professional interactions with clients, witnesses, support staff, and other individuals").
76. See Aiken, supra note 72, at 1.
77. Michelle S. Jacobs, Legitimacy and the Power Game, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 187, 191
n.17 (1994).
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remedying our society's racism.... [W]e seek racial diversity in our
student bodies and faculties because a central mission of the
university must be the eradication of America's racism. We cannot
pursue that mission without the collaboration of significant
numbers of those who have experienced and continue to
experience racial subordination.78
After documenting the pervasiveness of continuing racial
discrimination,79 Professor Lawrence reasoned that "[w]hile everyone
is harmed by the damage racism does to our social fabric and our
souls, the injury that racism does to racial minorities is concrete,
immediate, personal and unceasing. ' 80 Lawrence further reasoned
that while experiences of subordination "uniquely" qualify minorities
to fight racism, "white students, faculty, lawyers or judges" also bring
"talents, skills, and values that are essential to the project of our
common liberation."'s He concludes that "[t]he fight against racism
must, in the end, be an interracial collaboration."'82
C. Mentoring and Role Modeling
Dean Brest and Miranda Oshige have also observed that faculty
of color serve important social roles within a law school and
78. Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31
U.S.F. L. REv. 757,765 (1997).
79. See id. at 767-70 & n.47 (observing that the "recently formed Presidential Advisory
Board on Race has called the problem 'virtually intractable,' and has noted that it
continues to influence all aspects of American life including policies regulating the
economy, education, health, even the environment"); see also Note, An Evidentiary
Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1357, 1366-67 (1996) ("In American society, race powerfully influences an individual's life
experiences. Career attainment, neighborhood composition, family structure, and personal
associations vary across different races. 'At the level of experience of everyday life, race is
an almost indissoluble part of our identities."') (quoting Michael Omni & Howard Winant,
On the Theoretical Concept of Race, in RACE, IDENTITY AND REPRESENTATION IN
EDUCATION 3,5 (Cameron McCarthy & Warren Crichlow eds., 1993)).
80. Lawrence, supra note 78, at 775-76. As one commentator observed:
The influence of race on experience is not confined to racial minorities-it
extends to whites as well. Whites often underestimate the impact of their race
and the race of others. 'To be born white is to be free from confronting race on a
daily, personal, interaction-by-interaction basis.' The experiences of whites in
America are qualitatively different from those of nonwhites. For example,
whites and blacks generally view race relations in America in very different
terms: whites point to the continuing decline of racial discrimination, whereas
blacks continue to be dismayed by racial barriers. The positive value of
whiteness to whites is demonstrated by the statements of white students who
maintained that they would have to be compensated $1 million dollars a year to
give up their racial identities and become African American for fifty years.
Note, supra note 79, at 1367-68 (quoting T. Alexander Aleinkoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,1066 (1991)).
81. Lawrence, supra note 78, at 775-76.
82. Id.
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university. They stated:
It is largely the faculty who set an institution's tone and agenda.
The presence of minority faculty-regardless of their areas of
teaching and scholarship and, indeed, regardless of their particular
beliefs-tends to make minority students feel that they are
welcomed at the institution. Faculty who belong to these groups
often provide important counsel, support, and comfort for minority
students-especially, but not only, when events occur that seem to
threaten their sense of acceptance at the institution. Also, although,
by the very choice to attend law school, a law student has already
made a significant career decision, the presence of minority faculty
members lends reality to the possibility of academic careers for
minority students. Finally, as important as the support that minority
faculty provide for members of their own groups is the effect of
their teaching, mentoring, and academic leadership on white
students, many of whom have not regularly encountered members
of minority groups in positions of authority.83
Scholars of color have been careful to point out the problematic
nature of the assumption that faculty of color can or should shoulder
these role model or mentoring responsibilities84 and have argued that
83. Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 864-65; see also id. at 871 ("The visible
competence of minority group members may reduce outsiders' negative stereotypes and
reinforce positive ones about the group as a whole."). Put another way, faculty diversity
is also important to improve the educational experience and practical value of
legal education for people of color. The availability of 'role models' is only a part
of what is at issue here. Improvements should derive in part directly from what
minority teachers do in and out of the classroom, and in part from their influence
on what white teachers do. And the benefits should run to white students as well
as to students of color.
Kennedy, supra note 8, at 716 n.28; see also LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING
GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INsTITUTONAL CHANGE 86-88 (1996)
(expressing preference for the term "mentor" over "role model" since mentors perform
active supportive roles in advancing opportunities for students of color beyond the mere
symbolic presence or "spokesmodel" status connoted by the term "role model"); Yvonne
J. Chandler, Why is Diversity Important for Law Librarianship?, 90 L. LIBR. J. 545, 552
(1998) (noting that faculty of color "not only can serve as role models for minority
students, but can also be sources of mentoring relationships, financial aid and scholarship
information,.. . assistance in career development... [and as part of] a support system that
stands in the place of the crucial family support system that students leave behind when
they come to school").
84. As stated by Professor Donna Young:
Being a role model imposes professional limitations and can be psychologically
burdensome. Because role models are under intense scrutiny, our human
weaknesses must be hidden in order to display the desired image. Moreover,
several questions must be asked. Will we be compensated for our 'counseling'
responsibilities? Will our counseling duties be given weight during tenure
decisions? What if we reject the role as mentor? Will we be penalized in some
way? Where are the boundaries of our mentoring duties?
Donna E. Young, Two Steps Removed& The Paradox of Diversity Discourse for Women of
Color in Law Teaching, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 270, 281 (1996); see also Anita
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faculty of color roles should not be circumscribed as such.85 Placed in
more expansive terms, Professor Placido Gomez has argued that
faculty of color are "more than mere role models. They may
contribute to minority students' sense of belonging; a sense that the
system may tolerate or even appreciate, a different world view, an
alternative reality. '86
In the clinical teaching context, faculty diversity is also important
to serve the unique professional development needs of students who
will likely confront invidious discrimination in the legal system.
Faculty that have confronted marginalization, stereotyping, and
dignitary assaults as lawyers can draw on these experiences to mentor
and model lawyering against personal subordination to students.87
For example, Professor Michelle Jacobs has described the multiple
layers of marginalization experienced by clinicians of color. She
writes:
We, as lawyers of color, are treated differently and must deal with
the ways race impacts on our own ability to represent clients
Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22, 24, 25 (1990-91) ("The
[role model] argument encourages the inference that black women are inferior
intellectuals and that white teachers have no role to play in addressing the special needs of
black students. The quest for 'positive' minority role models demanded by the role model
argument risks stereotyping minorities on the basis of race and gender, imposing upon
black women teachers the felt obligation to be perfectly 'black' and perfectly 'female."').
Compare Enrique R. Carrasco, Collective Recognition as a Communitarian Device: Or, of
Course We Want to be Role Models!, 9 LA RAZA L-. 81 (1996) (arguing that law
professors of color committed to diversity should assume a role modeling function for
students of color based on a "complex and multidimensional" conception of role model
that is "rooted in community and critical to reform") with Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1222 (1991) (setting out arguments against role modeling by faculty of color
including assertion that role models must be assimilationist and deceive students into
accepting the myth of liberalism's equal opportunity). See generally Adeno Addis, Role
Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1386 n.22 (1996) (noting
that "some minority scholars seem to be simultaneously attracted to and suspicious of the
concept of role models").
85. Johnson, supra note 34, at 319-20 n.11.
86. See Placido G. Gomez, White People Think Differently, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
543, 545 (1991); see generally Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference
Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 74 (1998) (noting that a
comprehensive study of the impact of diversity in law school classrooms has as its "most
striking" finding, "the connection between the presence of a teacher of color and greater
participation by students of color").
87. See generally Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black
Attorneys and the Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997) (describing
the damaging consequences of tokenism, stereotyping, and marginalization of African-
American and other attorneys of color in the legal profession); Suellyn Scarnecchia,
Gender and Race Bias Against Lawyers: A Classroom Response, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 319 (1990) (describing various forms of racial and gender bias against lawyers in
the legal profession).
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effectively in a legal system in which we, like our clients, are
marginalized. Because of the existence of racism, the students
under our supervision will have a different clinical experience than
those students under the supervision of a white colleague. A
student under my supervision will encounter acts of marginalization
committed against me as her supervisor, and simultaneously,
against her client (who looks like me).88
While Jacobs concludes that hierarchy in the clinical professor-clinical
student relationship is required to maintain professorial legitimacy in
the face of the legal system's (and probably her own law school's)
inevitable invidious microaggressions, 89 I believe that the assaulted
clinician's efforts to combat those slights can provide particularly
valuable teaching and learning opportunities for students who will be
forced to confront similar assaults throughout their careers.
88. Jacobs, supra note 77, at 189.
89. See, e.g., id. at 190-93 (describing incidents confronting the author, an African-
American female clinical professor, who was treated as a subordinate to a white Latina
student and, in another situation along with two female students of color (one African-
American and one Asian-American), was ignored by a white male court officer while the
officer only addressed the white male opposing counsel in the case). Indeed, my
conversations with other clinical professors of color at clinical conferences have revealed
that many of us have frequently been identified by judicial personnel or opposing counsel
as the client or student in our cases, or treated patronizingly or otherwise presumed to be
unknowing or of questionable competence by judicial personnel, opposing counsel,
colleagues, deans, or by our own students in myriad small yet irritating and incessant ways.
Cf Russell, supra note 87, at 769 n.10 (describing similar incidents regularly encountered
by attorneys of color). Professor Peggy Davis has powerfully described the concept of
"microaggressions" as:
"[S]ubtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put
downs' of blacks by offenders." Psychiatrists who have studied black populations
view them as 'incessant and cumulative' assaults on black self-esteem .... The
management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity, simultaneously
necessary to and disruptive of black adaptation .... Vigilance and psychic energy
are required not only to marshal adaptational techniques, but also to distinguish
microaggressions from differently motivated actions and to determine "which of
the many daily microaggressions one must undercut."
Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565-66 (1989) (citations
omitted). Professor Margaret Russell has expounded on the impact on attorneys of color
from microaggressions in the legal system, noting that:
The debilitating, lingering effects of such routine and recurrent degrading
treatment should not be underestimated as significant influences in the formation
of professional identity... [It would be naive to assume that the above factors-
tokenism and everyday, microaggressive harassment-do not exert a profound
and destabilizing impact upon minority lawyers' conceptions of professionalism,
attorney-client interaction, case selection, lawyering strategy, courtroom
behavior, and a host of other concerns.
Russell, supra note 87, at 770; see generally JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997).
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D. Legal Services Operational Needs of Communities of Color
Certain forms of employment involving the delivery of important
services to subordinated communities, such as public safety, health
care, legal services and public education, depend for their
effectiveness, on the ability of the service providers to attain the
confidence, respect, cooperation of (and sometimes a collaborative
relationship with) community residents. Because of mistrust and
suspicion generated from years of mistreatment, insensitivity or non-
responsiveness by virtually all white public service provider corps,
diversity in public service employment often furthers pressing
operational and functional needs in communities of color.90 A wide
range of authorities has argued that a more diverse and
representational public service corp serves important community
operational needs such as facilitating responsiveness and fair
treatment by those service entities as well as promoting respect for
and cooperation with the service providers among community
residents.91 Indeed, with respect to the most studied and reviewed
community service provider-the police-the Courts,92 Congress,93
90. See generally Note, Recent Case, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1997) (describing the
operational needs justification for affirmative action); Nancy Love, Detroit Police
Officers' Association v. Young: The Operational Needs Justification for Affirmative Action
in the Context of Public Employment, 7 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 200 (1980-81) (same); Note,
Race as an Employment Qualification to Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 412 (1979) (same).
91. See, e.g., notes 90, 92-98.
92. As the Sixth Circuit recognized, the compelling operational need for greater
representational employment in the public safety area "is not simply that blacks
communicate better with blacks" but:
Rather, it is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the
public support and cooperation which result only from public respect and
confidence in the police. In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of
minority officers, but on the public's perception of law enforcement officials and
institutions.
Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979); see also Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[Ain integrated
police force could develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a
more effective job of maintaining law and order than a force composed only of white
officers."); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996); Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863
F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1983);
Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 996-1000 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd sub nom.,
Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983); Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 977-78 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated as moot sub nom., Boston
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983); NAACP
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973); Doores v. McNamara, 476 F. Supp.
987, 995 (W.D. Mo. 1979); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410
F. Supp. 873,896-97 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
93. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 10 (1971) ("The exclusion of minorities from
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the United States Civil Rights Comnnission 94 and other federal
agencies, 95 have long recognized and documented the considerable
operational and functional benefits of diversity in public service
employment. Their reasoning has extended to recognize the
importance of diversity at the higher-level, policy-making ranks as
well.
96
More recently, the United States Justice Department has
forcefully endorsed "a wide range of operational needs" that it views
as constitutionally "compelling" and which support racial and ethnic
diversity in federal employment.97
According to the Justice Department, operational justifications
that may be compelling include:
effective participation in the bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority
problems in that particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too
often hostility towards the entire process of government."); H. REP. No. 92-238, at 17
(1971) ("The problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute and has the most
deleterious effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to the minority
communities (notably education, law enforcement, and the administration of justice) with
the result that the credibility of the government's claim to represent all the people is
negated.").
94. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIviL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST 83 (1970) ("Public officials and
private citizens, including judges, lawyers, probation officers, all expressed the belief that
the fear and distrust which many Mexican Americans feel toward law enforcement
agencies could be significantly dispelled by increasing the number of Mexican American
law enforcement officers at all levels of authority.").
95. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.301 (1982) (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) regulations provide "that the full and equal participation of... minority
individuals in employment opportunities in the criminal justice system is a necessary
component to the Safe Street Act's program to reduce crime and delinquency in the
United States.").
96. In Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n., the Sixth Circuit also found that the operational
needs concerns extended to diversity among higher level administrators since "[i]f
minority groups are to feel that they are not policed entirely by a white police force, they
must see that Negro or other minority officers participate in policy-making and other
crucial decisions." 608 F.2d at 695 (quoting the President's COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 172
(1967)); see also Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920 (finding operational need for promotion of black
lieutenant in prison boot camp with 70% black inmates); Williams, 720 F.2d at 923 (finding
a "particularly" great need for integration of the supervisory ranks); Talbert v. City of
Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 932 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding a "legitimate interest" in the
integration of the "top ranks"); Baker, 433 F. Supp. at 998 (rejecting claim that the city's
operational needs extended only to black patrolmen and concluding that "[t]he
importance of black lieutenants in reducing discriminatory practices cannot be
overstated"). But cf. Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,
215 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that City of Charlotte failed to demonstrate that it had a
compelling interest in achieving diversity among its police sergeants).
97. Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, Post-Adarand Guidance on
Affirmative Action in Federal Employment (Feb. 29, 1996), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 43 (Mar. 5,1996).
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[(1)] assuring "that decisionmakers will be exposed to the greatest
possible diversity of perspectives"; [(2)] enhancing the performance
of "an agency that is charged with handling matters that
particularly affect minorities and minority communities (e.g., public
housing and urban policy; economic dislocation in minority
communities; immigration; health care in underserved
predominantly minority communities; conditions in tribal
reservations or villages)"; [(3)] obtaining "the cooperation and
confidence of the community" by being representative of that
community; [(4)] creating diversity in the military, which will
"maintain combat readiness" by "maintain[ing] morale and
cohesiveness"; [(5)] enhancing the operation of EEO offices that
must "gain the confidence of current or former employees who
already feel that they have been subject to discrimination"; and
[(6)] enhancing the operation of "community relations offices that
are called upon to quiet racial tensions in troubled
neighborhoods. ''98
These concerns extend to the provision of legal services in low-
income communities of color.99 As two legal services managing
attorneys have observed:
When clients believe that legal services advocates share a common
understanding of their problems, they are more likely to look to
legal services as a resource and to participate in and support
advocacy strategies that empower them. Likewise when staff
believe that the program is trying to meet their needs, they are
more likely to support the program's goals and objectives... The
absence of significant numbers of staff, managers, and policymakers
makers who come from the same backgrounds as legal services
clients inhibits a common perspective on clients' issues and
prevents a greater understanding of clients' concerns.1
°°
Consistent with the above concerns, the Legal Services
98. Kingsley R. Browne, Nonremedial Justifications for Affirmative Action in
Employment: A Critique of the Justice Department's Position, 12 LAB. LAW. 451, 453-54
(Winter/Spring 1997) (quoting Schmidt, supra note 97, at 11, 10, 11, 11, and 12
respectively).
99. But cf. Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal
Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON
HALL CONST. LJ. 459, 474-75 (1999) (suggesting that the operational need justification
for affirmative action should be limited to public service employment that involves the
"legitimate use of force" such as police officers and should not extend to teachers and
firefighters).
100. Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflections from the Bottom of the Welk Racial Bias
in the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 311, 314 (1993);
see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 728 (noting "the creation of modem civil rights law by
black lawyers who devised the litigation strategy of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People" and concluding that "[it would be farfetched to argue
that the race of these lawyers was irrelevant to their choice of subject matter or that the
black civil rights cause would have evolved in the same way had all the lawyers involved
been white").
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Corporation ("LSC") has promulgated regulations requiring legal
services offices to establish qualifications for attorney positions that
include:
[(1)] knowledge and understanding of the legal problems and needs
of the poor; [(2)] prior working experience in the client community
or in other programs to aid the poor; [(3) the] [a]bility to
communicate with persons in the client community, including, in
areas where significant numbers of eligible clients speak a language
other than English as their principal language...; [(4)] cultural
similarity with the client community; [and (5) residence in the client
community.]1O
The ABA has adopted more general standards for all providers of
legal services to the poor which provide that:
Concerted efforts to recruit and select personnel who reflect the
heterogeneity of the client population enhance ... the provider's
ability to serve its clients effectively. Relationships of mutual trust
are developed more readily when clients see their heritage and
experiences reflected in the persons who serve them. °2
These operational considerations are applicable to law school clinical
programs since many, if not most programs provide legal services to
low-income communities disproportionately comprised of persons of
color.10 3 Indeed, United States Department of Education ("DOE")
regulations also reflect recognition of the importance of diversity in
clinical programs receiving Title IX Clinical Legal Experience
Program funds.1° The DOE explicitly evaluates funds applicants in
part based on "the extent to which the applicant, as part of its non-
discriminatory employment practices, encourages applications from
persons who are members of groups that have been traditionally
underrepresented."'105
101. 45 C.F.R. pts. 1616.3 (c)-(Q), 1616.5 (1999).
102. R. David Adams, Legal Aid Should Sue Itself over Hiring Practices, THE CrrY
SUN, Mar. 6-12,1991, at 29 (quoting ABA Standards for Providers of Legal Services to the
Poor).
103. See Dinerstein, supra note 71, at 470 n.3 ("In fact, most live-client clinical
programs continue to deal with the legal problems of poor people.").
104. See 34 C.F.R. pt. 639 (1999).
105. See 34 C.F.R. § 639.31(b)(2)(iv) (1999). Professor Duncan Kennedy has identified
another community need furthered through law faculty diversity-the need for the
intelligentsias of subordinated communities to have access to the knowledge producing
resources of the academy to enhance their communities' effective exercise of political
power. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 713. "[P]art of the general strategy of building
minority intelligentsias so that subordinated communities can participate effectively in the
political process" is premised on the assumption that "increasing the number of law
teachers of color will influence the experience of law students of color in directions that
will empower subordinated communities." Id. at 716 n.28.
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11. Addressing the Problem
Below are some suggestions and recommendations for
commencing a process to address the lack of clinical faculty diversity
in the vast majority of American law schools.
1. Because denial is often a major obstacle to recovery, the
academy as a whole, and more specifically, clinical organizations (the
Clinical Legal Education Association ("CLEA") and the AALS
Clinical Section) and clinical faculty must unambiguously and openly
acknowledge that there is a problem.1°6
2. The academy should urge vigorous enforcement of AALS
Bylaw section 6-4c which provides that "[a] member school shall seek
to have a faculty, staff, and student body which are diverse with
respect to race, color and sex." Faculty participating on site inspection
teams for accreditation reviews should ensure that this standard is
applied and enforced with respect to clinical diversity.
3. Pursuant to AALS Bylaw section 6-4c, member schools should
be encouraged to adopt diversity plans, describing the steps they are
taking and plan to take to produce diversity throughout their ranks,
including their clinical programs, within specified time periods.1°7
Apart from AALS bylaws, there is now substantial precedent in the
106. I am deeply grateful for the assistance of Professor David Chavkin in promptly
providing me thorough data and information in response to all of my inquiries and we are
all in his debt for his tireless and thankless work as treasurer and statistician of the clinical
section. Having parsed through the data, however, I must respectfully disagree with his
statement posted on the national clinical professors' listserve on February 22, 1999, that
"concerns about under-representation of racial and ethnic minorities [in clinical faculty
positions] are also not supported by the trend in the statistics." E-mail from Professor
David Chavkin to <clinsec-l@lists.cua.edu> (Feb. 22, 1999).
107. Dean Brest and Miranda Oshige have set out the following assumptions regarding
the proper application of diversity criteria in law faculty appointments:
First, law schools seek faculty members having all or some of the following
characteristics, with different institutions assigning different weights to them:
excellence in teaching, excellence in scholarship, expertise in particular subjects,
skills and knowledge from other disciplines, and practical experience deemed
relevant to legal education. Second, affirmative action in effect adds to this list
membership in particular racial or ethnic groups. Third, just as different
institutions weigh the other factors differently, they may give different weight to
the presence of minority faculty; but no plausible affirmative action strategy
would encompass hiring a faculty member not qualified for his or her academic
responsibilities.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 8, at 857. Similar assumptions should apply to the application
of diversity principles in clinical faculty appointments. However, as discussed supra at
notes 65-74 and accompanying text, the determination of what it means to be "qualified"
for one's faculty responsibilities as a general matter and, more specifically, for one's
clinical faculty responsibilities, can be an elusive and self-perpetuating assessment. See
infra Recommendation #8 (recommending comprehensive study of the standards and
criteria employed in clinical personnel decisions).
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private and public sectors for diversity plans. By 1995, one third of all
Fortune 500 companies had a diversity plan in place and another third
planned to establish one.108 Examples of steps law schools have taken
or could take include imposing a freeze period on steps to fill a
clinical faculty opening during which time the school will conduct
affirmative outreach to all relevant law professor, clinical and
lawyers' organizations of color about the vacant position;1°9 requiring
a good faith effort to hire clinical faculty members of color within a
specified period of time and requiring documentation of those efforts
by the hiring unit, requesting new positions in subject areas with high
proportions of potential candidates of color, using contacts with
faculty at other institutions, especially senior faculty of color, to
locate promising candidates of color and then invite them to apply for
available positions, and utilizing visitorships to identify and recruit
candidates of colors;"0 conducting a systematic examination of the
school's policies and practices at each stage of the employment
relationship-including recruitment, retention, promotion and long-
term contracting or tenure processes-to determine whether they are
doing everything they can to promote diversity, to weed out
inadvertent or unconscious practices which adversely limit access and
opportunities for persons of color and to ensure that each individual's
true contributions to the learning environment at the university are
fully and fairly taken into account."'
4. Law schools should consider the adoption of fellowship and
graduate law programs which take affirmative steps to provide entry
level experience and exposure to potential clinical faculty of color
based on the concept of programs such as the University of Wisconsin
Law School's William Hastie Fellowship or Harvard Law School's
Charles Hamilton Houston Fellowship. These are non-clinical
fellowship programs which lead to graduate law degrees (LLMs) and
which affirmatively recruit law graduates of color. Clinical fellowship
models exist, such as those at Georgetown, Northwestern, the
University of Connecticut and the University of Baltimore, which
108. See Jenny McClure, Diversity Training: A Competitive Weapon, MGMT. REV., June
1996, at 25.
109. See Letter from Professor David Dittfurth to Matt Taylor, DOE (Aug. 24, 1994)
(enclosing St. Mary's University Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Plan for
Clinical Education which provides for outreach to fifty-four minority and women's legal
organizations during the freeze period) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
110. See Culp, supra note *, at 1162-63 (describing Duke University's general faculty
affirmative action plan).
111. See Alger, supra note 38, at 197-99. Indeed, the application of clinical
methodology designed to facilitate the development of a critical consciousness on the
operation of power and privilege would benefit such a systematic examination. See Aiken,
supra note 72, passim (describing such methodology).
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could be borrowed and targeted to increase the representation of
entry level clinical faculty of color. This approach is expressly
authorized by the U.S. Department of Education which stated in
policy guidance on the application of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to race-based financial aid that a university could properly
pursue the goal of enhanced faculty diversity "by enrolling graduate
students who are committed to becoming professors and who will
promote the overall diversity of scholars in their field of study,
regardless of the diversity of the students who are admitted to the
university's own graduate program.""12
5. The ABA should adopt CLEA's proposed amendments for
accreditation standard 301 which provides:
(a) A law school shall maintain an educational program that is
[designed] effective to qualify its graduates for admission to the bar
and to prepare them to participate effectively in the legal
profession in a multicultural, global society.
(b) The educational program of a law school shall [be designed]
effectively [to] prepare the students to deal with both current and
anticipated legal problems and to deal with legal problems of a
variety of segments of society." 3
6. The AALS Clinical Section and Minority Section should
sponsor a joint session designed to promote the entry of lawyers of
color into the clinical teaching field by providing opportunities for
information exchange, mentoring, advice, and informal networking.
The AALS Minority Section conducted a program of this nature for
lawyers of color interested in traditional law teaching in the Fall of
1998. Therefore, an analogous model is readily available.
7. The AALS Clinical Section, Clinical Directors' Conference
should sponsor sessions on creating and managing diversity in clinical
programs and on increasing diversity in clinical managerial
positions." 4
112. DOE, supra note 46, at 8761 n.8.
113. CLEA's proposed additions to Standard 301 are in bold and the proposed
deletions are in brackets.
114. The problem of managerial gross underrepresentation and exclusion is also
endemic in the ranks of public interest law from which many clinical faculty members are
recruited. Some of the worst manifestations of this problem are described by the
Executive Director of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys in New York City:
Management has placed white attorneys into unadvertised supervisory positions
without an affirmative action search, and in some cases after denying that such
openings existed. Attorneys of color are routinely rejected when they do
apply.... This pattern creates a disincentive to applicants as well as to those
attorneys of color already on staff to remain and resulted in the Association of
Legal Aid attorneys submitting an in-depth proposal for affirmative action and a
15-point grievance filed by Attorneys of Color of Legal Aid.
Adams, supra note 102, at 29. I have witnessed similar problems in the selection of a law
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8. The CLEA, and/or the AALS Clinical and Minority Group
sections should undertake a study of the nature of obstacles to the
hiring, retention, tenure and promotion of clinical faculty of color.
The study should propose short-term actions and long-term solutions
and should include analysis of the validity and impact of standards,
criteria and processes utilized in clinical hiring, retention and
promotion decisionmaking.115
Conclusion
There are no 'quick fixes' or 'silver bullets' that will promptly
rectify the significant underrepresentation of clinicians of color on
school clinical director. At one school, a Dean selected a white male member of the
clinical faculty as overall acting director to replace a departing clinic director and did so
within hours of the Dean's receipt of the departing director's resignation. The chosen new
white male director had once served as the director of an individual clinic, but had been
removed from that position due to a prior Dean's perception of his managerial
ineffectiveness-which included that Dean's perception of his inability to successfully
integrate persons of color into positions in that clinic. In addition, he had failed to achieve
tenure within the six-year up-or-out period but had been granted a position as a clinical
faculty member on a long-term, non-tenure track contract which averted his termination.
Among the persons passed over for the acting director position, which carried with it a
substantial salary raise and an increase in power and authority over the clinical programs,
included five directors of individual clinics who were either persons of color or women or
both. One was tenured and one received tenure shortly after this decision was made.
Four of the five directors filed discrimination grievances with the University.
115. For discussion of the legality under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of law
faculty hiring and promotion criteria which disproportionately exclude law faculty
candidates of color and are not validated for job performance, see Norman Redlich, Law
School Faculty Hiring Under Title VII: How a Judge Might Decide a Disparate Impact
Case, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 135 (1991); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII
to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982) (discussing the application of Title
VII to subjective hiring criteria in professional level positions); see generally Ann C.
McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective
on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decisionmaking Under Title
VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003 (1997) (explaining the application of Title VII intent and
disparate impact models to old boy network hiring, contrasting recent cases involving
challenges to race-conscious personnel decisionmaking and arguing for abandonment of
race-neutral/race-conscious paradigm in Title VII discriminatory intent cases). For
discussion of the legality of considering race and ethnicity in law faculty hiring, compare
Joyce A. Hughes, "Reverse Discrimination" and Higher Education Faculty, 3 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 395 (1998) (reviewing case law and observing general judicial deference to
higher' educational institutional objectives in response to "reverse discrimination" claims
and suggesting that "reverse discrimination" is "a value laden concept which can and has
been used to denigrate African Americans") with Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse
Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 993, 995-1004 (1993) (providing hypothetical opinion finding that a state law school's
hiring process that involved separate gender and race segregated review of job
applications and reserved slots for women and minority candidates violated Title VII,
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause).
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law school faculties.116 In the long run, true diversity will only be
achieved if those in positions of hiring and promotion authority come
to recognize diversity's educational and functional necessity in an
increasingly multicultural and global society and in an American
polity and legal system so pervasively affected by race. As in other
areas of the academy,
The fact remains that hiring practices.., are still discouraging, and
advancement opportunities are limited. These practices can only be
reversed by an honest assessment of attitudes and a sincere desire
to change negative patterns of behavior. This will take
introspection on the part of our... membership if we are to see
increased diversity in our field in the twenty-first century... the
surest way to bring about a change of attitudes is the willingness to
challenge old patterns of thinking and behavior. Change will come
about when groups in control risk sharing it with others different
from themselves... We have much to gain by embracing
Fewness ... [We] can only grow from fresh, new, diverse ideas, andindividuals. 117
116. Cf. Joan S. Howland, Diversity Deferred, 90 L. LIBR. J. 561, 574 (1998) (using the
same metaphors and reaching a similar conclusion with respect to achieving diversity in
law librarian positions).
117. Id. at 575 (quoting Judy Dimes-Smith, Law Librarianship: An African-American
Perspective, L. LIBR. LIGHTs, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 4,5).
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